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Victim Assistance in the World Today
According to average budgets of the 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, victimassistance programs are the third most-funded category after clearance and humanitarian
mine-action program oversight. The author thinks the global mine-action community needs
to reconsider how it handles victim assistance. This article outlines the qualities necessary
for effective victim assistance and calls the community to action.
by Mike Boddington
[ Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise and National Regulatory Authority ]
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hink about it: Without victims, there would be no
mine action. It is only because people get maimed
and killed that we clear mines. It is only because
people get seriously injured that we educate them to prevent landmine accidents. In fact, we would never have secured a mine-ban convention1 were it not for the horrific
accidents experienced by civilians.
It seems strange to me that victim assistance is a low
priority when it comes to funding; the lion’s share of funding goes to clearance. Clearance is, of course, expensive. In
Lao PDR, it costs between US$64 and $834 2 for every landmine or item of unexploded ordnance cleared. Since millions of units require clearance, both in Laos and around
the world, that adds up to big bucks—and by the logic that
prevention is better than a cure, getting rid of landmines
and explosive remnants of war3 makes a lot of sense.

diminished the money available for victim assistance
because it concentrated on mine clearance. This decrease
occurred even though the monetary total f lowing into
humanitarian mine action increased.
Today, we can look at the statistics we have available
and see that about $30 million is flowing into victim assistance from official (government) sources every year, fluctuating only slightly annually. 5 Those funds have to cover
all six elements of victim assistance, not just physical rehabilitation. 6 Of course, it does not include all of the money
donated by foundations and small donors to nongovernmental organizations, but it is very difficult to know how
much money they donate. I think it is unlikely, though,
that we would find that the total amount going into prosthetics and orthotics—i.e., physical rehabilitation—was as
much as the 1995 figure of $40 million.

Creativity Needed
It will, however, take a ver y long time to remove
the remaining ERW, and we will likely continue to see
landmine/ERW victims, regardless of how much we
educate against risky behavior. In February 2006, the
Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, set a goal of zero
victims by 2015. Setting goals like that brings a guffaw to
mine-action practitioners. They say such an ambition is
impossible to achieve; however I subscribe to that sort of
thinking because any victim is a gross violation and, until
we start thinking zero victims, we cannot devise ways to
achieve this important marker. Perhaps we will then find
that it is not impossible.
In 1995, I estimated that the total amount of money
f lowing into prosthetics and orthotics in low-income,
mine-affected countries was about $40 million a year. Five
years later, with the benefit of the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines’ Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance
Programs 4 (prior to its amalgamation with the United
Nations Mine Action Service’s Portfolio), there was a total
of $20 million earmarked for victim assistance, of which
$15 million was slated for prosthetics and orthotics. The
terrible truth is that the passage of the Ottawa Convention1

What Not to Do
There are many things people in the mine-action community do to try to help victims. There are times, however,
when what we do can have a negative, rather than a positive, effect on people. Three examples of instances when
victim assistance may result in false hopes are:
1. Going into mine-affected areas as a journalist and
taking pictures of victims; the victims think that,
perhaps, someone will now notice their plight and
do something to help them.
2. Doing a survey of mine victims, visiting their houses
and learning the nature of their injuries and what
they need to assist them; they will think that help is
now definitely on the way.
3. Establishing some service—like physical rehabilitation—running it for a few years and then closing it
down due to lack of funding; people become used to
receiving assistive devices and then get put back to
where they were before (or worse)—having sampled
what life can be like.
The last of these examples has happened repeatedly.
Establishing a good service in a country can take at least
15 years. Few donors are able and willing to support a
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COPE has been able to increase the number of clients fitted with devices tenfold since it was established in 1997. Before that, it would have been unthinkable to see so many patients waiting
or undergoing service.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF JOE PEREIRA

program for this length of time; therefore,
running a project in the long term means
finding a continuing succession of donors
willing to pick up the baton and run with it
for a few years.
This challenge leads to the sustainability
question: Donors want to know whether the
project will be sustainable when they complete their three-year input.7 No, of course it
won’t. A project is sustainable if it will continue. If you end the funding after three years
and take away the foreign expertise, can you
expect it to continue? The Vice-Minister

of Health from Mozambique, Abdul Razak
Noormahomed, addressed the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention in Geneva in 2000. He said, “Don’t come
to countries like mine and set up your expensive rehabilitation projects and then expect
our governments to take them over. We won’t.
We can’t even provide primary health care for
50 percent of our populations. Why should
we spend money that would immunize 1,000
children against polio on a single person who
has lost his leg and will simply become another statistic in the pool of unemployed?”

Here is a below-knee (or, more technically, trans-tibia) prosthesis, now complete with its cosmetic cover hiding the
components that give it its main strength. This leg is ready to go.

Let’s Meet Our Requirements
There is an obligation written into the
Ottawa Convention that says: “Each State Party
in a position to do so shall provide assistance
for the care and rehabilitation and social and
economic reintegration of mine victims.”8 The
clause goes on to suggest how such assistance
might be routed.
Fundamentally, any nation that has signed
the Convention is required to help victims if it
is in a position to do so. I interpret “in a position to do so” as “having the money”; simply put, it is the job of the richer signatories to
fund the poorer signatories. That just has not
been happening.
One of the problems is, of course, that we
do not know how much money is needed. That
is to say, we do not know how many victims
are in need of assistance. We also do not know
what sort of assistance they need. There was a
movement in 2001–2003 to prepare a regional
victim-assistance plan for Southeast Asia, but
that appears to have yielded no significant
output. What is required is a victim-assistance
plan for the world, and the Southeast Asian
plan could have been the first plank in that.
United Nations Mine Action Service’s
annual Portfolio of Mine Action Projects is
working toward that, but it still only supports
30 countries and three territories that are
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2007 Portfolio data reveals the average budgets
per year outlined in Table 1 below.
O f c ou r s e , t he su m for t he G ene v a
Inter nat iona l C ent re for Hu ma nita r ia n
Demining is not included here, either—that
would increase the coordination figure.

mine-affected. For reasons best known to themselves, major players—such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Handicap
International—decline to include information about their programs. One thing that the
Portfolio does allow us to see, however, is the

Mine Action Programs

Average Budget for 2007 (in US$)

Clearance

286 million

Coordination

72 million

Victim Assistance

33 million

Mine Risk Education

29 million

Data Collection

14 million

Treaty/Advocacy

2 million

Stockpile Destruction

1 million

Total

Fund—independence, impartiality and transparency—can quickly prove this to be a lie.
It is time to take that idea out of the cupboard and dust it off. Without such a fund,
there appears to be no prospect that innocent
victims can ever receive the amends they both
need and deserve and which they might have
thought would be forthcoming upon ratification of the Ottawa Convention.
See Endnotes, page 110
The views expressed here are those of the
author and are not necessarily shared by the
organizations for which he works or to which
he alludes.

436 million

Table 1: Average budgets (in US$) of mine-action programs in the 2007 Portfolio.
Drawn from an analysis of data contained in the UNMAS Portfolio of Mine Action Projects.

way in which coordination, administration and
oversight of humanitarian mine-action programs have grown to consume a substantial
part of the total funding. The analysis of the

It is hard to understand why victim assistance has fared so badly. One oft-stated reason is
that it mainly involves the provision of services,
and it is not the job of international donors to
provide services in low-income
countries. I am not going to
argue that issue here—I simply
refer you to the point made by
the Mozambican Vice-Minister
of Health above.

One of COPE’s UXO victim clients who made his own leg. Many farmers who
come to our clinics arrive with their homemade limbs. Generally, the only sources of metal readily available out in the rural areas are UXO. The metal in the leg
is probably sourced from a fuel tank.
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One Solution
In t he early 1990s, Stan
Wi ndass, t hen-Direc tor of
the Cambodia Trust, Trustee
o f P OW E R I n t e r n a t i o n a l
(a Br it i s h NG O t h at pr o vides victim assistance) and
Director of the Foundation
for Internat iona l Secu r it y,
put forward a proposal that a
Mine Victims Fund be established. He suggested that it
would be funded sufficiently
and continuously to provide
for most of the needs of projects supporting mine victims.
His proposal stated this fund
would be totally independent,
impartial, professional and
transparent. It would also have
an institutional memory of all
of the victim-assistance projects around the globe. The idea
attracted many supporters, but
it had its detractors, especially
among the NGO community,
which saw it as a Trojan horse
for some of Windass’s NGO
interests. The characteristics
of the proposed Mine Victims

Mike Boddington became involved in
humanitarian mine action/victim assistance while working on rural development in Cambodia in 1991. That led
him to found POWER International,
an NGO aimed at assisting mine victims. POWER established activities in Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Zambia.
Boddington retired in 2001; in 2002,
he moved to Laos to further victimassistance efforts there. He continues his retirement while working
with the Cooperative Orthotic and
Prosthetic Enterprise and the National
Regulatory Authority in Lao PDR.
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